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En este documento se presentan algunos episodios y regularidades empíricas relevantes 
para el estudio de las finanzas públicas en Colombia desde 1923. Tales eventos y 
hechos empíricos se clasifican en varios grupos, entre los cuales se destacan los 
asociados con la dependencia de la economía en relación con el sector externo, los 
vinculados con la evolución del gobierno central, y los que ilustran la asociación 
estrecha entre el desarrollo del sector financiero y los ciclos de la deuda pública externa 
e interna. Para ilustrar las regularidades empíricas se acude a series macroeconómicas 
históricas. Ciertos eventos claves (choques externos, cambios institucionales) pueden 
producir efectos permanentes sobre las trayectorias de dichas series, y cambios en el 
intercepto y / o en la pendiente de sus funciones de tendencia. Para precisar las fechas 







This paper surveys some facts relevant for the understanding of the Colombian 
experience with public finance and debt since 1923. The stylized facts are classified in 
three groups as follows: first, facts associated with the dependence of the economy on 
the external sector; second, facts which reveal empirical regularities in the evolution of 
                                                        
*  La serie Borradores de Economía es una publicación de la Subgerencia de Estudios Económicos del 
Banco de la República. Los trabajos son de carácter provisional; las opiniones y posibles errores son 
responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores, y sus contenidos no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a 
su Junta Directiva. 
1/ Researcher. Banco de la República. Bogotá, March 2007. The first version of this article was 
written in 1988 at the University of Glasgow, following discussions with Richard Portes (Center for 
Economic Policy Research, London) and David Vines (Balliol College, Oxford). The first version was 
based on data for the period 1925-1985, and was prepared with the financial support of Fedesarrollo 
(Fundación para la Educación Superior y el Desarrollo) and its directors at that time, Miguel Urrutia and 
Eduardo Lora. Daniel Osorio did the job of updating the series. Special mention should go to David 
Ibáñez for research assistance. This is the twelfth of a series of papers on Colombia’s debt. 
   2
the fiscal sector; and third, facts which illustrate the close association between the 
development of the financial sector and the cycles of external and internal debt. 
Historical macroeconomic time series are used to illustrate episodes and empirical 
regularities. The presence of major events (external shocks, institutional changes) 
generates permanent effects on the path of those series, and produces shifts in the 
intercept and / or slope of their corresponding trend functions. Recent empirical 
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This paper surveys key facts relevant for the understanding of the Colombian 
experience with external and internal debt since 1923. At that time, crucial legal, 
monetary and budgetary reforms were put in place by Colombian authorities with the 
support of a U.S. technical mission led by Edwin W. Kemmerer
2. 
 
The stylized facts discussed in this document are classified in three groups as follows: 
first, facts associated with the dependence of the economy on the external sector; 
second, facts which reveal empirical regularities in the evolution of the fiscal sector; and 
third, facts which illustrate the close association between the development of the 
financial sector and the cycles of external and internal debt. 
 
In the first group the following stylized facts are considered: 
 
Fact 1. The reliance of the economy on a major staple (coffee exports) for the most part 
of the century, whose price depended on notable fluctuations in world markets. The 
terms of trade heavily depended on the fate of coffee international quotations
3. 
 
Fact 2. The outstanding importance of import duties in the composition of tax revenues. 
A downfall of imports implies negative effects on government receipts. Given 
restrictions on the availability of foreign exchange, as it happened during decades in the 
20
th century, an adverse shock on the terms of trade will be detrimental to imports and 
therefore to expected fiscal revenues
4. 
 
Fact 3. The major experiences of access of the economy to external financing coincided 
with the booms of foreign private lending in the late 1920s, late 1970s and the first half 
                                                        
2/  A number of important statutes in the realm of finance were enacted with the support, and some 
of them at the suggestion of the Kemmerer mission in 1923. They included Law 25 establishing a central 
bank in Colombia -the Bank of the Republic-, Law 34 on the formulation of the budget, Law 36 on the 
collection of national revenues, Law 42 creating the office of Comptroller General, Law 45 on banking in 
general, and Law 46 regarding negotiable instruments. Additionally, the mission proposed other 
institutional changes, including a new organization of the ministries. At the time the mission arrived, the 
financial functions of the government were divided between the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de 
Hacienda) and the Ministry of the Treasury (Ministerio del Tesoro). The first was in charge of the 
collection of taxes, and the second of the outlays. The mission proposed to unify these functions under a 
new Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Publico). 
3/  For the relevance of coffee in the Colombian economic and social development a classical 
reference is Nieto Arteta ([1958], 1975). For a general outlook of the importance of coffee on foreign 
trade and economic activity, a recent contribution is found in GRECO (2002, Chapter 7). Villar and 
Esguerra (2005) discuss the historical dependence of terms of trade on coffee prices during the twentieth 
century. 
4/  At the time of the Kemmerer mission in 1923 import duties represented 55% of the tax burden in 
Colombia. Its predominance fell over time: at the beginning of World War II the relevant figure was 33%, 
and in the mid 1950s it was about 25%. CEPAL (1957, p. 88, and Statistical Tables, Table 55). In the 
sixties and seventies the share declined to 20%, before going up again since the mid eighties to the mid 
nineties to 28%. From 1995 to 2004 that share came down to an average of 23.4%.   4
of the 1990s. In the interim, between the 1940s and early 1970s, such access mainly 
depended on funds made available by developmental organizations
5. 
 
In the second group the following stylized facts are mentioned: 
 
Fact 4. Except for a few years during the 1990s, the public sector was the predominant 
borrower of external funds during the period of study. The burden of the debt largely 
depended on the performance of exports: periods of high indebtedness and rapidly 
increasing exports showed low debt-to-export ratios, and periods of stagnated 
indebtedness and collapsing exports produced a high debt burden. Adverse shocks on 
export markets meant deterioration of creditworthiness
6. 
 
Fact 5. The behaviour of the internal public debt is dominated by marked upswings after 
adverse shocks arising in the external sector. In historical perspective, the internal 
public debt appears to have played a function of "shock absorber" when the economy 
underwent the negative shocks. As for the sources of financing of those temporary 
increases of the internal debt, the central bank was of leading importance, at least until 
the beginning of the 1990s. 
 
Fact 6. Authorities followed sustainable financial policies over time. This means that 
there existed a long-run relationship between government expenditures inclusive of 
interest payments and tax revenues. 
 
Fact 7. The time paths of the average tax rate and the rate of inflation suggest that the 
inflation rate was not chosen by governments as a public finance issue. 
 
The following stylized facts are classified in a third group: 
 
Fact 8. The three great international lending booms of the 20
th century had a marked 
influence in the development of the financial sector. When those booms came to an end, 
the financial system faced solvency difficulties. 
 
Fact 9. The internal public debt played a significant role in the rescue of the financial 
system and other sectors affected by the external crises of the 1930s ,1980s and 1990s. 
 
 
Three kinds of information are to be found in this document. First, some sections are 
designed with the idea of introducing the evolution of the Colombian economy during 
the period of study, as far as such path provides meaningful facts regarding public 
finance and debt. This is the case of the first section where the experience of an 
economy largely affected by the fate of its external sector is discussed. Second, most 
sections are aimed to illustrate the stylized facts listed above. A heavy emphasis is made 
on the historical evolution of the relevant statistical series. Third, although most series 
are accompanied by information about their statistical characteristics, some sections 
include additional tests when they are considered necessary to substantiate the stylized 
facts.  
 
                                                        
5/  Historical reviews of the Colombian experience with external indebtedness during the 20
th 
century are provided in Avella (2006) and Ocampo y Lora (1988). 
6/  Avella (2006, Gráfica 6)   5
A central interest in the discussion of statistical series is the presence of structural 
breaks. As the diagrams will reveal, some series exhibit abrupt structural changes in 
their mean. Those changes were associated to episodes which in some cases resulted 
important for the historical evolution of public finances and debt. For the estimation of 
significant break dates, a procedure suggested by Bai and Perron (2003) is followed
7. 
Table 1 displays significant break dates which affected the evolution of time series 
considered in this document. As seen, those break points appear to be concentrated in 
the first half of the forties and in the first half of the eighties, when the economy faced a 
variety of external shocks linked in the first case to the outbreak of World War II, and to 




Break dates in quoted macroeconomic time series 
1925-2003 
 
Time series  Break dates 
  
Gross Domestic Product  1943, 1980 
Purchasing Power of Exports  1942, 1953, 1967, 1979 
Imports 1942 
Net external financing  1981 
Government expenditures  1943 
Average tax rate  1983 





A. A general outlook of the economy. 
 
 
A picture of the economy with a broad brush can be drawn by following the behaviour 
of GDP growth rates during the period of study. Four phases are highlighted: the 
interwar years (mid-1920s to early 1940s), the so-called "external strangulation" period 
(mid-1950s to mid-1960s), a period of high growth rates (since the late 1960s) which 
ended in stagnation (early 1980s), and a full boom-and-slump cycle in the 1990s 
characterized by average lower rates than in the fifty previous years. This general 
picture is intended to serve as a general background for further discussions in this 
document.  
 
Important changes in the economic structure along the period of study are underlined. 
The most notable fact is the substantial fall in the contribution of the primary production 
sector to GDP as seen in Graph 1. Agriculture represented about 50% of output at the 
time of the great depression (1929-1933) and still constituted about 40% at the end of 
World War II. In the post-War period the agricultural share in output declined 
continuously, reaching about 22% in the mid-1980s, and around 15% at the end of the 
                                                        
7/  The approach is in the spirit of the intervention analysis, as described, for example, by Enders 
(1995, chapter 5). An overview is provided by Perron (1994).   6
20
th century. These facts reflect a modernization process which involved the 
development of the manufacturing and services sectors. 
 
The rapid increase in the percentage share of manufacturing in GDP during the 1940s 
and 1950s slowed down during the 1960s and 1970s before stagnating and even 
declining since the first half of the 1980s. Traditional services -commerce, construction, 
personal services and housing- represented a rather constant percentage of GDP, around 
28%, since the end of World-War II until the mid-1980s, before declining to around 
22% during the 1990s.  
 
Other services particularly associated with the urbanization process -transport, 
communications, financial services-, increased their participation in GDP from about 
10% in 1950 to over 20% in 1985 and stabilized around 23% in the 1990s. Finally, 
government services maintained a steady portion of about 8% of GDP in the post-War 
period, until the 1990s, when it went up to around 15% towards the end of the century. 
Thus, national accounts reveal a different evolution of government services in the last 























United Nations (2006) 
 
According to international standards the modernization process of the economy is less 
impressive than it appears to be in Graph 1. While the contribution of agriculture to the 
growth of GDP in the post-War period exceeded the average for small exporters of 
primary goods (19.6% vis-à-vis 18.2% between 1945-49 and 1980-84), industry notably 
lagged behind typical industrialization standards in those countries (22.9 vis-à-vis 
36.5%, also between 1945-49 and 1980-84)(Ocampo 1989, Table 6.5; Syrquin and 
Chenery 1989).    7
 
It has been hypothesized that agriculture has influenced not only growth but also 
financial policies. Some literature on international debt problems has explored the 
conjecture of a rural base of politics in Colombia as an explanation of why the country 
was the only commercial borrower in Latin America who escaped rescheduling 
programs during the 1980s (Urrutia 1989, 1990; Berg and Sachs 1988)
8. Independently 
of the validity of this hypothesis, it would be mentioned later in this document that rural 
interests frequently appeared along the period of study when important decisions were 
to be taken on internal and external public debt, exchange rates, and credit policies. 
 
The relative weight of agriculture in the Colombian case can also be illustrated with 
reference to other major Latin American debtors. While during the U.S. lending boom 
of 1925-29 the shares of agriculture and industry in GDP in Colombia were 52% and 
8% respectively, the corresponding figures in Argentina were 26% and 20%, in Brazil 
22% and 13%, and in Mexico (a major historical debtor although not an important 
borrower in the late 1920s) 22% and 21%. Later, in the 1975-79 period, coinciding with 
the beginning of a new borrowing boom, while the Colombia's shares were 26% and 
22%, the relevant figures for Argentina were 13% and 35%, for Brazil 8% and 33%, for 
Chile 9% and 39%, and for Mexico 9% and 31%. And in the last lending boom of the 
century, while in Colombia the shares were 15% and 24%, in Argentina were 6% and 
24%, in Brasil 7.3% and 25.7%, in Chile 6% and 29%, and in Mexico 6% and 22% 
(Mitchell 1993, United Nations 2006). 
 
In the historical annals regarding public debt, the Colombian case is frequently 
discussed with relation to other important debtors in Latin America
9. In this general 
outlook the question is how Colombia has historically fared in the context of major 
debtors in the region. Some international estimates show that the Colombia's annual 
average compound growth rate during most of the 20
th century, the 1929-1987 period 
was 4.3%, a middle way between the higher rates of 5.4% and 4.8% for Brazil and 
Mexico respectively, an the lower figures of 2.9% and 2.6% for Chile and Argentina 
respectively. The economic performance of these countries worsened during the 1980-
87 period (the so-called "lost decade"), with Colombia reaching an average growth rate 
of 2.8%, ahead of Brazil with 2.4%, Mexico with 1%, Chile with 0.6% and Argentina 
with -0.6% (Maddison 1992). Once more, these countries played a crucial role in the 
emerging market credit cycle of 1993 – 1999. And this time, in contrast with the 1980s, 
Colombia was left behind in terms of growth. For the period 1990 – 1999, Chile and 
Argentina went ahead with an average rate of 6.3% and 4.2%, while Mexico, Colombia 
and Brazil, just reached 3.3%, 2.8% y 1.8% (United Nations 2006). 
 
The exposition now turns to a description of aggregate output evolution during the 
period of study. Three great phases may be distinguished in the evolution of the growth 
rate of output during the period 1925-2004 (Graph 2.2). The first extends from the 
booming mid-1920s through the first half of World War II; the annual growth rate 
reached 3.9%. The second period dominates more than three decades, embracing the 
recovery after the War, the expansionary late 1960s, and the coffee bonanza of the late 
1970s; the average growth rate went up to 5.4%. The third period starts in the critical 
                                                        
8/  Berg and Sachs (1988) highlight "the heavy political influence of the coffee growers" in the 
adoption of exchange-rate as well as financial policies which led to a relatively low foreign indebtedness 
of the country in the Latin American context. 
9/ For  instance,  Eichengreen, B. and Portes, R. (1987).    8
early 1980s and encompasses a full growth cycle at the end of the century
10. Graph 2.1 
emphasizes the fact that the main break point in the series took place in 1980 at the end 





Colombia’s Economic Growth 
Growth rates of GDP 
1925-2003 
 
1. Break dates: 1980 
 
                                                        
10/  A general guidance regarding the Colombia’s economic performance during the 20
th century is 
provided in Ocampo (2007) and Ocampo, Lora y Steiner (1994). 
11 /   For the break point at 1980 the estimated coefficients were as follows: 
For the period 1926-1980: 0.04656; t-value: 14.56 
For the period 1981-2004: 0.02848; t-value: 5.86 
And for the break dates at 1943 and 1980: 
For the period 1926-1943: 0.03807; t-value: 5.09 
For the period 1944-1980: 0.05069; t-value: 16.58 
For the period 1981-2004: 0.02848; t-value: 6.61 




2. Break dates: 1943, 1980 
   10
 
Notes: dpib: Annual change in real GDP in logs 
Sources of annual data of real GDP: 
CEPAL (1957) 
Banco de la República: www.banrep.org/ 
 
 
1. The interwar years 
 
A sketchy interpretation of the three periods just described is now offered. Roughly 
speaking the first period corresponds to the last stage of an unprecedented exports' 
bonanza which with some interruptions had lasted since the beginning of the century. 
The boom was fuelled by extraordinary injections of external credit. The external 
upsurge peaked in 1928 before a dramatic collapse of the terms of trade and a sudden 
interruption of foreign loans.  
 
The economy moved from an average growth rate of 8% in 1926-28 to an average of -
1.3% in 1930-31. An immediate recovery was possible after the withdrawal of the gold 
standard and the implementation of expansionary policies. Exchange and import 
controls, and exchange rate adjustments were introduced to restore external balance. An 
extraordinary though not unprecedented decision was the official moratoria on external   11
debt payments. To recover internal balance activist policies involved increased 
government expenditures, cheap bank loans and an enlarged stock of internal public 
debt. Both sets of policies revived the economy and encouraged the development of the 
manufacturing sector, particularly of consumption-goods import-competing industries. 
The intensive utilization of internal public debt was a temporary measure followed by 
fiscal reforms in 1935. A new tax regime was at the heart of the reforms. Apart from its 
pretensions of promoting a better income distribution, the new regime sought to reduce 
the dependence of budget revenues from custom duties. 
 
During most of the 1930s the terms of trade evolved below their historical trend (not 
shown). The world quotations of coffee, the major staple, were depressed, and the 
situation deteriorated even more during the international coffee crisis of 1937-40. This 
last episode opens the second period whose first phase (1939-45) dominated by World 
War II, illustrates alternative macroeconomic conditions: from recession and price 
deflation (1940-41) to recession and high inflation (1942-44). 
 
2. The "external strangulation" period 
 
An important ingredient of the inflationary juncture of 1942-44 was the collapse of 
imports induced by the international conflict: the reduction of imports precipitated a 
budget deficit and hastened a substantial accumulation of international reserves. All the 
time authorities sustained a fixed-nominal exchange rate in force since 1935. Fiscal 
decisions adopted to finance the budget, including 'forced' allocations of public bonds, 
made part of drastic measures of monetary sterilization.  
 
As revealed in Graph 2.2 the slowdown of economic activity during 1940-43 led to 
some of the lowest growth rates of the economy along the period of study. It was during 
World War II that a clear break arose between the growth rates associated to the boom-
and-bust cycle of the twenties and thirties, and a long period of on average higher 
growth rates which would last until the late 1970s. 
 
A new cycle of accelerated imports and falling reserves followed the end of the War. 
The burst of imports was particularly hurried by wartime-repressed imports of 
intermediate and capital goods required by the growing manufacturing sector. The sharp 
decline in international reserves led to successive devaluations of the nominal exchange 
rate in 1949 and 1951. The succession of alternative and extreme economic 
circumstances during the 1940s is reflected in the ample oscillations of the growth rate 
of GDP as illustrated in Graph 2.2. However, as the graph suggests, quick oscillations 
of the growth rate of the economy are not an exclusive feature of the 1940s. On a more 
moderate scale the experience is reiterated in the late 1950s and during the 1970s and 
early 1980s. 
 
A new phase of prosperity was fuelled by a price coffee bonanza which dominated 
during the first half of the 1950s. Booming imports of capital goods buttressed the 
industrialization process, and enlarged fiscal revenues allowed an unprecedented 
expansion of government expenditures. When the boom came to a halt the economy 
found itself dealing with a sharp fall of coffee prices, a trade balance deficit, and piling 
up import-payment arrears. This accumulation of short-term trade debts was refinanced 
by means of parallel arrangements with the Export-Import Bank and commercial banks 
(a consortium of New York private banks), concurrently with a stand-by arrangement   12
with the IMF. The notable fact here is that for the first time since the collapse of 
external financing in the early 1930s a syndicate of private banks was offering credits to 
Colombia. 
 
The end of the external bonanza of the mid-1950s marked the beginning of a recessive 
phase which lasted until 1967. These were years of "external strangulation" dominated 
by a chronic shortage of foreign exchange. A diversity of trade and exchange rates 
policies orientated to restablish external balance was frequent in this period. Important 
developments in import-competing industries were supplemented by a resolute policy of 
export promotion. As for exchange rate changes a maxidevaluation in 1957 put the 
exchange rate back on its historical trend of real devaluation; though other nominal 
adjustments of the exchange rate were carried out in the early 1960s, they did not have a 
comparable lasting effect. Internally, an expansionary fiscal policy financed with 
increased internal and external debt took place in the early 1960s. This expansionary 
movement was stimulated by the optimistic prospects of the Alliance of Progress -a pact 
of economic cooperation signed in 1961 between the United States and its Latin 
American allies-. International creditors and observers presented Colombia as the 
"showcase of the Alliance of Progress". However, recurrent difficulties to achieve 
external balance rapidly frustrated the expansionary impetus. 
 
3. From rapid growth in the 1960s to stagnation and crisis in the 1980s 
 
A phase of high rates of economic growth during 1968-72 was stimulated by a buoyant 
international economy and a set of policies orientated to increase external 
competitiveness. A crawling-peg exchange rate arrangement, foreign exchange controls 
and a regulated access to external credit constituted the framework enacted at that time, 
which practically unmodified would last until 1991. Nontraditional exports were 
stimulated, and the purchasing power of exports recovered their historical growth trend 
for the first time after the downswing of coffee prices in 1956. Yet, these encouraging 
results fell too short to overcome reiterated trade-balance deficits. It was an important 
inflow of foreign credit of official origen which financed the external disequilibrium, 
and provided part of the funds which fed one of the most notable expansions of public 
expenditure in the post-War period. 
 
The expansionary years came to an end in the mid-1970s on the brink of an 
international recession. Additionally, the inflation rates reached heights (23.6% in 1973-
75 compared with 7% in 1968-70) which although with ephemeral precedents in the 
past, for the first time exhibited symptoms of persistence at high levels. Policies to 
combat against inflation and to strengthen the diversification and promotion of exports 
were designed in the mid-1970s. A fiscal reform destined to eliminate subsidies and 
invigorate tax revenues, and measures of financial liberalization were introduced to 
restore internal stability. And an acceleration of the rate of the crawl was chosen to 
improve external competitiveness. 
 
An emphatic demonstration of the effects of coffee-price cycles on the economy was 
lived through during the years 1976-81: an unanticipated and relatively prolonged boom 
of the international quotations (1976-78) followed by a sharp decline (1979-81). The set 
of policies orientated to increase the competitiveness of the economy broke down. As 
the coffee bonanza went on, international reserves built up to unprecedented levels, the 
monetary base expanded at higher rates and the rate of inflation reached its second   13
highest peak in the whole series. Authorities slowed down the devaluation rate of the 
crawling peg, then allowing the real exchange rate to appreciate with the consequent 
loss of competitiveness in the non-coffee tradables sector. In the late 1970s the 
economy found itself with a high stock of international reserves and a low stock of net 
external debt: in fact, by 1980 exports tripled net external debt. Other results were less 
satisfactory. Import-competing industries stagnated and a backward movement affected 
the process of export diversification. Additionally, the movement towards financial 
liberalization was partially reversed as authorities sought to reduce inflationary 
pressures by controlling bank lending. 
 
The prospects of the economy worsened in the early 1980s, as seen in the downswing of 
growth rates with respect to their average record over the previous three and a half 
decades (Graph 2.2), or in the relative low growth rates which resembled those of the 
early 1940s. Apart from the negative impacts of the international economy -price shocks 
of 1973-74 and 1979-80 and the industrialized countries' policy responses- which were 
by their nature global, domestic policies could have increased the vulnerability of the 
economy.  
 
The following three phases can be observed in the first half of the 1980s: First, the 
collapse of coffee prices and the outbreak of the worst recorded trade balance deficit. In 
spite of these facts the devaluation rate of the crawling peg was insufficient to avoid a 
real appreciation of the exchange rate. The eroding effect of the trade deficit on the 
stock of international reserves was disguised by a substantial increase of external debt, 
and the internal counterpart of this enlarged external debt was an increased government 
expenditure. Further, governments financed a considerable portion of the broadened 
spending with proceeds obtained from the financial investment of international reserves. 
There was also a change of attitude regarding the access of the private sector to foreign 
credit; while in the late 1970s it was restricted, in the early 1980s private firms were 
allowed to obtain fresh funds in the buoyant international market. This change of 
attitude was to complicate matters in the immediate future. Finally, the central 
government and public enterprises intensively turned to the banks during the climax of 
foreign bank lending (1978-82). As a result, three quarters of the increased indebtedness 
of the economy during these years were contracted with commercial banks. 
 
The second phase coincides with the aftermath of the Mexican crisis in 1982. Foreign-
bank loans to private firms and domestic commercial banks virtually dried up. The 
external disequilibrium could no longer be veiled by borrowing and international 
reserves started falling. At the same time the negative impact of the debt crisis on 
neighbouring economies -important export places- added up to the fragile trade balance 
situation. 
 
The third phase (1984-1986) is distinguished by drastic processes of external and 
internal adjustment. External adjustment was pursued by a combination of commercial 
policies and devaluation. A mixture of import quotas and export subsidies added to an 
existent and tight belt of exchange controls. A strong acceleration of the rate of the 
crawl rapidly rendered a real exchange rate similar to that reached in 1975, when the 
economy achieved the by then highest recorded level of external competitiveness. 
Internal adjustment was tried for by decreasing government expenditures, namely 
cutbacks in public investment and real reductions of wages in the public sector; 
additionally, ambitious tax reforms were implemented to broaden the tax base and   14
increase budget revenues. While the internal adjustment could render the expected 
results, governments used massively but temporarily the expedient of internal public 
debt: bond issues were allocated in open market, but given the weakened financial 
position of the Treasury, the Central Bank ended up redeeming a significant amount of 
issues.  
 
A crucial difference between the financial crisis of the 1930s and its replica of the 1980s 
was the continuity of debt service payments. Despite the drying-up of foreign 
commercial bank loans the country managed to honour its external commitments along 
the decade. Important ingredients of this process were a substantial increase of loans 
from official sources and a notable contribution of foreign direct investment during the 
early 1980s. Contrasting with a common experience in the continent, debt restructurings 
were not a fact in the relationship with commercial banks. Yet, new medium- and long 
term loans approved by these banks in the second half of the 1980s were not an exercise 
of "voluntary lending"; they required prolonged negotiations frequently involving 
political pressures on the banks. As in the 1940s, the U.S. government played a 
"persuasive" role; in the recent experience, pressures from the IMF and multilateral and 
bilateral institutions influenced the outcome of negotiations. 
 
4. Opening up the economy in the 1990s. A new boom and bust cycle of external 
financing. 
 
At the turn of the second half of the 1980s the economy was in a process of recovery, in 
part explained by a short coffee bonanza during 1986. The economy grew at a rate over 
4.3% between 1985 and 1990, leaving behind the critical early 1980s. However, there 
was at the time an extended opinion according to which the productive potential of the 
economy could be facing a slowdown
12. To make matters worse, the International 
Coffee Agreement, through which producers could get stable quotations, collapsed by 
1989. Analysts considered that the inward growth model adopted since the end of 
World War II was no longer a source of dynamism in the productive sector. It was 
thought Colombia should embark on a program of microeconomic liberalization 
measures, in a way similar to the liberal policy reforms implemented in other parts of 




Political institutions were a matter of debate and reform in the first years of the 1990s. 
The constitutional chapter on public finance was reformed, the central bank was given a 
new role, and the monetary financing of the budget deficit was tightly restricted.  
 
A series of events in the external sector marked the beginnings of the 1990s. Trade 
liberalization reforms reduced the average tariff protection from 83.0% in the mid-
1980s, one of the highest in Latin America at the time, to 6.7 in 1992, one of the lowest 
of the continent
14. This radical conversion to free trade came about after a substantial 
increase of the real exchange rate intended to strengthen exports. Initially, authorities 
                                                        
12/  The Program for the Modernization of the Economy put in place in 1990 was designed to 
promote external as well as internal competition. (Cuellar, 1994), (Fernández, 1994). 
13/  According to the celebrated expression due to Dennis Robertson (1938), who emphasized the 
role of international trade in the expansion of the world economy from 1860 to 1913. The phrase is still 
widely quoted in academic studies on economic development. For example, recent discussions are found 
in Bhagwati, J. and Srinivasan, T. N. (2002) and Bhagwati (2004). 
14/ World  Bank  (1993)    15
put in place a gradual process of transition since the beginning of 1990, but by 1991 
import liberalization was accelerated and a new framework for capital account 
transactions was implemented. By then, a new wave of capital imports was reaching the 
Latin American shores, and Colombia was not an exception
15. External private debt 
skyrocketed, aggregate private expenditure reached unprecedented levels, and aggregate 
demand doubled a growth rate of the economy above its historical records
16. While the 
second half of the 1980s was characterized by the reestablishment of internal and the 
external balance, by 1995 the economic scene was characterized by a huge current 
account deficit (5% of GDP) and an appreciated real exchange rate. 
 
If growth, global and in emerging economies had been characteristic in the first half of 
the 1990s, the outstanding feature of most of the second half was the slowdown of 
growth. For the first time since the mid-1970s, the overall emerging market GDP 
growth underperformed a weak OECD growth rate in 1998
17. A boom-bust credit cycle 
contributed to shape the business cycle in both global and emerging economies. 
Financial turmoil in Asia in 1997, and Russia in 1998 spread to Latin America. 
Consequently, the external financing of emerging markets such as that of Colombia, 
swung sharply. A precipitous slowdown dominated the Colombian economy during the 
period 1996-1999, reaching a growth rate of -4.8 in the last year, the lowest figure ever 
recorded. At the turn of the century, the economy was growing well below its historical 
rates, and recovery was a word that only could be used since the years 2003 and 2004, 
within a context of better performance of the industrialized world and trade partners.  
 
As in the late 1970s, international bank lending exploded in 1995-1996. In fact, banks 
worked as the main swing factor in the emerging market credit cycle of 1994-1999. On 
the analogy of the early 1930s and early 1980s, the violent swing in net foreign flows 
fed a new chapter of internal financial crises. Once again, the internal public debt 
worked as a shock absorber mechanism, but this time –within the constitutional 
framework enacted in 1991- the central bank was not a direct source of government 
financing as it happened in those previous episodes. 
 
In conclusion, these descriptions give the image of an economy which was substantially 
affected by the fate of its external sector. Disturbances in the international economy 
involved both the current and the capital account, and a good deal of policies applied 
during the period of study was conceived to face those shocks. This brings the 
exposition to a discussion of shocks arising in the goods and in the capital market, as 
well as to a general perspective of policies adopted to maintain external balance.  
 
B. External sector. 
 
                                                        
15/  Before the implementation of reforms in Latin America, there was an extended pessimism in 
foreign capital markets regarding a recovery of capital exports to the region. The consolidation of the 
reform process was one important argument for the rebirth of capital flows to Latin America. The 
substantial scale of inflows benefited the emerging markets as a whole, but the distribution was quite 
uneven. Asia received over 50%, and Latin America around 25% between 1993 and 1996. This was the 
prelude of a strong collapse of capital flows in 1998-1999. Morgan (1999). 
16/  While the average growth rate of GDP between 1993 and 1995 was 5.3% -above the normal 
value of 4.5%-, the corresponding figure for aggregate demand was 9.4%. Figures calculated from Banco 
de la República, www.banrep.org/ 
17/ Morgan  (1999)   16
Three issues are discussed in this section. The first describes export shocks as 
summarized by the path of the purchasing power of exports (PPE), and import shocks. 
The second shows how the access of Colombia to foreign lending has been largely 
determined by ample and sporadic waves of private funds (late 1920s, late 1970s and 
mid-1990s); when private lenders retreated in the 1930s, external financing depended on 
official organizations (especially in the 1950s and 1960s) and scattered initiatives of 
foreign direct investment, until the start of international bank loans in the 1970s. The 
third outlines the evolution of exchange rate arrangements designed to cope with 
external instability. 
 
1. Shocks originating in the goods market 
 
A description of shocks in the goods market is offered by the evolution of the terms of 
trade (TOT) or (PPE). This last measure which includes TOT and also real export 
effects is shown in Graph 3. The series exhibits four significant brake dates in 1942, 
1953, 1967 and 1979
18.  
 
Changes in mean are closely linked to the fate of coffee prices: a drastic decrease in the 
mean of the series appears to be associated with the external strangulation period which 
lasted from the mid-1950s, coinciding with the end of the coffee boom of the time, to 
the late 1960s; another decrease takes place at the beginning of the eighties, after the 
collapse of the coffee prices, and the new reduced level persists until the first years of 
the new century. Two significant increases in mean, the first in 1942, and the second in 
1967, characterize the series; the first reveals the revival of exports towards the end of 
World War II and its immediate aftermath, and the second the golden years of export 
promotion in the late sixties and early seventies, which culminated with the beginning 








                                                        
18/  The significant brake points are given by the  following estimates: 
For the period 1926-1942: 0.008472; t-value: 2.27 
For the period 1943-1953: 0.04687; t-value: 2.84 
For the period 1954-1967: -0.008357; t-value: 2.62 
For the period 1968-1979: 0.039198; t-value: 2.37 
For the period 1980-2003: 0.017134; t-value: 2.26   17
 
 
Sources of original data: 
Cepal (1957) 
IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook 
 
 
Shocks are not limited to export markets. They can also appear in the import market. In 
the Colombian case import shocks have affected not only the current account, but have 
had significant fiscal effects. Although fiscal dependence on import tariffs and on other 
taxes on foreign trade has declined over time, negative changes in imports have always 
adversely affected government finances. Table 2 shows the average share of custom 
duties in total budget receipts between 1924 and 2005. An extreme fiscal dependence on 
tariffs inherited from the 19
th century took place up to the mid-1930s, when political and 
fiscal reforms were implemented. With the adoption of income taxation in 1936, the 
share of customs fell to about one third of the budget. Coinciding with the political 
period of the National Front (1958-1974) and the opening of the economy in the last 
decade of the 20
th century, that share reached its lowest historical average.  
 
 
Table 2   18













Source: Annual tax data from Informe Financiero del Contralor. Annual Report. 
 
A limited availability of foreign exchange derived from adverse export shocks (a fall in 
PPE), or constraints on foreign borrowing (loss of access of the country to external 
financing including foreign bank trade credits) can be quoted between the causes of 
import downswings. Also supply shortfalls (export restrictions abroad) should be 
mentioned. The clearest, although extreme case of export rationing abroad was lived 
through during World War II, when the collapse of imports contributed to one of the 
major fiscal crises during the period of study. As a matter of fact, the only significant 
break point in the whole series took place precisely in 1942, as shown in Graph 4
19. 
Finally, it has to be noted that imports are affected by government policies (exchange 




Growth rates of Imports 
1925-2003 
                                                        
19/  For the break point at 1942 the estimated coefficients were the following: 
For the period 1926-1942: -0.02341; t-value: 2.10  
For the period 1943-2003: 0.0469; t-value: 1.98 
   19
 
Notes: dlorusim: Annual per cent change in real imports in dollars 
Sources of original data: 
Cepal (1957) 
IMF International Financial Statistics 
 

































































































Notes: Cycles: deviations from trend (Hodrick-Prescott filter, λ=100) in logs  
Sources of original data: 
Cepal (1957) 
IMF International Financial Statistics 
 
 
In Colombia the share of imports in GDP has fluctuated substantially over time. High 
points were achieved during the booming late 1920s and the 1950s (around 13%), and 
low points during the great depression and World War II (around 5%). During three 
decades -1960s, 1970s, and 1980s- the average share was 11.8%. A higher level was 
achieved after the reforms of the early 1990s; in fact, the new average reached 21% 
between 1994 and 2005. The succession of cycles in the series of imports is depicted in 
Graph 5. 
 
Even in relatively closed economies the income elasticity of imports may be high. In the 
U.S. case (where the share of exports and imports was around 4% in the 1950s and 
1960s, and about 7% in the 1950s to mid-1980s), estimates of the income elasticity of 
imports up to the mid-1980s varied between 1.5 and 2.0 (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1986). 
In countries were imports are restricted by the availability of foreign exchange, such in 
the Colombian experience, the income elasticity of imports is expected to be low. Early 
econometric evidence suggested that in the Colombia's case this elasticity was around 
0.8 (Musalem, 1971), Carrizosa (1979). 
 
In conclusion, two types of facts have been highlighted. First, the cycles of the PPE 
resulting from external shocks transmitted through the goods market. Second, the 
crucial importance of custom duties in government revenues, and therefore, the fiscal 
effects of import shocks. 
 
2. Shocks arising from the capital market 
   21
The access of Colombia to international financing can be divided in four periods. First, 
the interwar period in which long-term public and private bonds were placed in 
financial centres such as New York and London. The suppliers of funds were mainly 
individual investors. This extraordinary financing was suddenly interrupted after the 
1929 crash. Second, the postwar period up to 1970 when long term-funds were provided 
by official institutions. Third, the revival of international private financing through 
commercial bank loans (medium- and short-term) since the early 1970s up to the early 
1980s, but heavily concentrated on the years 1979-82. And fourth, the access of the 
country to the emerging market credit cycle of 1993-1999. During these four periods, 
lending operations were supplemented by foreign direct investment and usual suppliers' 
credits. 
 





Then, f'=dIR-TB, where dF' is the annual flow of external financing and r' the external 
interest rate. TB is the trade balance. Note that dF' includes financing to the public and 
the private sectors, and also foreign direct investment. 
 
Cycles of f' are depicted in Graph 6a, where exports have been used as a scale variable. 
Actual values give the annual ratio of the net flow of external financing to the flow of 
exports. Two main characteristics are observed. First, the extremes of the series are 
dominated by notable positive cycles which correspond to the access of the country to 
the boom of private-long-term funds in the 1920s, to the boom of commercial bank 
funds in the late 1970s and to the resurgence of private loans in the 1990s. These events 
were followed by sharp cutbacks of external financing in the early 1930s, the early 
1980s and the late 1990s. The second characteristic of the series is the nearly year-to-
year oscillations of f' around trend since the early 1950s to the late 1970s coinciding 
with the period in which official institutions were the dominant source of foreign credit. 
The series suggests a stop-go behavior of the net funds provided by developmental 

































































































































Notes: Net external financing as a proportion of exports, f’/x = (dIR – TB)/X. Cycles are calculated as 
deviations from trend (Hodrick-Prescott filter) 
dIR*: change in international reserves; TB*: trade balance; X: exports.  




Graph 6b emphasises the presence of a structural brake in 1981, in the aftermath of the 
coffee bonanza of the late 1970s, and just before the outbreak of the international 





Net external financing 
Structural Changes in the series 
1925-2003 
 
                                                        
20/  The only significant break date in 1981 is defined by the following coefficients: 
For the period 1926-1981: 0.009429; t-value:2.23 
For the period 1982-2003: -0.034682; t-value:2.12 
Other potential structural brakes in the series did not appear to be statistically significant.   23
 
 
Notes: dndirx: Change in net external financing as a proportion of exports 
Sources of original data: As for Graph 6a 
 
 
In conclusion, the stylized fact at this point is that the major experiences of access of 
Colombia to external financing during the period of study have coincided with the 
major cycles of foreign private lending this century. When the boom-and-bust cycle of 
foreign loans of the 1920s came to an end, the access to external lending was limited to 
concessional finance made available by official development institutions. New full 
cycles of private international lending would take place in the late 1970s and mid-
1990s. 
 
3. Exchange rate policies and other adjustment measures 
 
Five phases dominate the landscape of the real exchange rate during the period of study. 
Different arrangements appear in the background of its historical performance. The gold 
exchange standard ruled foreign exchange transactions after 1923 when important 
institutional reforms took place. This exchange rate arrangement was in force during the 
boom of the late 1920s and survived the international financial crisis of 1929-30.   24
Colombia was one of the last countries who abandoned the gold standard since 
convertibility was suspended only after the devaluation of the pound sterling in late 
1931. 
 
The breakdown of the gold standard was followed by a new phase in which a managed 
float arrangement (1931-36) was replaced by a fixed exchange rate system which lasted 
until 1948. While the managed float period was characterized by a process of strong real 
depreciation of the national currency, the fixed exchange rate period was dominated by 
a tendency to overvaluation of the exchange rate particularly since the outbreak of 
World War II.  
 
Attempts to correct for overvaluation of the exchange rate characterized a new phase 
between the late 1940s and early 1950s, but the key measure was a single 
maxidevaluation performed in 1957. These adjustments happened in a context in which 
different exchange rates for different transactions were applied, and the exchange 
controls introduced after the collapse of the gold standard were preserved. 
 
A further phase started in 1967 with the adoption of a crawling-peg exchange rate, the 
reinforcement of controls on international capital flows, and the tendency to a unique 
exchange rate. A gradual real devaluation of the peg which clearly outstripped the 
historical trend dominated during most of the 1970s, before the coffee bonanza in the 
second half of the decade induced policy rectifications. These changes led authorities to 
slow down the rate of devaluation of the crawling peg, which eventually implied a 
substantial overvaluation of the real exchange rate (in 1981 the real exchange rate was 
25% overvalued in terms of the level of competitiveness achieved in 1975, the highest 
one achieved up to the 1970s). Correction of misaligned exchange rates was one of the 
policy priorities after the 1982 external crisis, and that adjustment was fulfilled by 
means of a strong acceleration of the rate of the crawl -60% between 1982 and 1986-. 
 
In Latin America, the 1990s started under the sign of competitive real exchange rates, as 
part of overall programs of trade reform. At the end of 1990, the Colombian real 
exchange rate reached its highest historical record in the 20
th century. This process came 
to a halt when abundant capital inflows reached the continent since 1992. Colombia 
tackled the real appreciation by undertaking sterilization operations, and by imposing 
reserve requirements on short-term capital inflows. At that time, the crawling peg 
regime put in place in Colombia in 1967 was substituted by a controlled-floating regime 
(1991) and later on by exchange rate bands (1994).Despite these policies, authorities did 
not fully ease the pressures on the real exchange rate which continuously appreciated 
between 1991 and 1997. As a matter of fact, the real appreciation amounted to 40% 
during that period. When the emerging market credit cycle of the late 1990s subsided, 
the real exchange rate came back to the depreciating track. This time, it depreciated 
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Notes: ITCR: Real Exchange Rate Index 
Sources for the original data: 
Banco de la República: Informe del Gerente a la Junta Directiva (1925-1980) 
Banco de la República: www.banrep.org/ 
 
 
For most of the 20
th century the exchange rate was only one within a set of instruments 
designed to preserve external stability. Other instruments had considerable importance 
in policy agendas. An outstanding example was given by exchange controls created for 
the first time in 1931 after the announcement of suspension of convertibility of the 
pound sterling. Since then, continuously, though with differing severity, controls were 
applied to the regulation of the capital account up to the early 1990s. Other instruments 
were closely related to the regulation of the current account, such as quantitative import 
controls. In practice, authorities did not use to rely on one single instrument but on a 
mixture of them. A publicized argument for not depending only on the exchange rate 
was that the high instability of world coffee prices would be transmitted to the economy 
straightaway through the exchange rate (Díaz-Alejandro, 1976). 
 
 
C. Fiscal Sector 
 
Three sources of stylized facts are considered here. First, the evolution of government 
expenditures, government revenues and budget deficits as a proportion of the size of the 
economy; the attention is called to the different shape of the series during the post-War 
period in comparison with 1925-45. Second, the evolution of external and internal 
public debt; in the former case, the evolution of the debt-export ratio, and in the latter, 
the cycles of internal public debt, are followed. Then, a description of the path and 
composition of real public debt is presented. Third, the series of expenditures, revenues 
and debt are discussed altogether, to see whether the fiscal accountancy suggests that 
governments followed sustainable financial policies during the period of study; the   26
discussion is closed by exploring to which extent the series of government revenues as a 
proportion of GDP (the average tax rate), seems to be correlated with the inflation rate 
series as predicted by the equilibrium approach to public finance. 
 
 
1. Central government expenditures 
 
Two main periods can be distinguished in the evolution of real government 
expenditures -Graph 8-
21. From the mid-1920s through 1950 the importance of 
government spending declined relatively to the size of the economy. The magnitude of 
the fiscal adjustment that followed the boom in the 1920s is illustrated by a cutback of 
expenditures from 8.5% to 4.5% of GDP between 1928 and 1935; there was one 
outstanding interruption in 1933 when authorities deliberately increased expenditures to 
stimulate recovery and finance a temporary border conflict with Peru. The ratio went up 
during the first half of World War II to be followed by a drastic adjustment during the 
second half of the conflict. In averages, government expenditures represented 7% of 
GDP in the late 1920s, and somewhat less, 5.5% in the "optimistic" five years that 
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Notes 
Government expenditures net of interest debt repayments. 
Sources 
Informe del Contralor. Yearbook 
 
 
A rather different image emerges from 1950 through the end of the series. The average 
ratio of government spending to GDP grows over time, and the shape of the series 
                                                        
21/  Government expenditures are defined as the annual flow of government expenditures excluding 
any payment for interest on internal and external debt. This definition will lead to the concept of primary 
budget deficit, below.   27
suggests that periods of rapid increasing government spending are followed by shorter 
periods of retrenchment. There is nearly a pattern every decade with expansionary 
waves of 5-6 years followed by contractionary movements of 2-3 years. 
 
A supplementary view is offered by the cycles of government spending around their 
trend -Graph 9-. As seen, relative to the trend, the positive cycle of the late 20s has no 
parallel in more recent history. The four positive cycles after 1950 happened under 
different contexts: the two intermediate cycles corresponded to expansionary periods in 
which government projects were widely supported by the availability of concessional 
external funding. At the two extremes, the positive cycles emerged as a result of 
countercyclical policies implemented at the end of the coffee bonanzas of the early 
1950s and mid-1970s. Starting in the late 1980s, the graph suggests that over its last 
fifteen years the series tends to persist above its trend. Finally, as shown in Graph 10 
only one significant break point characterizes the series, namely, the year 1943
22. As 
from that date, the rates of growth of real government expenditures were characterized 































































































































Percentage deviations from a linear trend in logs. 
Sources 
Informe del Contralor. Yearbook 
 
 
                                                        
22  The estimated coefficients for the break date at 1943 are as follows: 
For the period 1926-1943: 0.0155; t-value: 2.05 
For the period 1944-2003: 0.0660; t-value: 3.13   28
Graph 10 





dlorgove: Growth rates of real government expenditures 
Original source of data. Informe del Contralor. Yearbook. 
 
 
2. Central government revenues and primary budget deficit 
 
There is a similar shape between Graph 8 above and Graph 11 for the average tax rate 
below, particularly during the period before 1950.  
 
 
Graph 11   29
Government Revenues
1925-2005







































































































































































Government revenues as a percentage of GDP. 
Sources of original data: 
For fiscal data: Informe del Contralor. Yearbook 
For GDP series. As for Graph 2 
 
 
Discrepancies between graphs 8 and 11 become more obvious in the second half of the 
century. In the early 1960s and 1980s, increasing ratios of government expenditures to 
GDP coincided with declining ratios of government revenues to GDP; these experiences 
differ from those of the 1950s and late 1960s when expenditure expansions were 
accompanied by revenue expansions, both as a proportion of GDP. 
 
The ratio of government revenues to GDP is taken as the average tax rate. It can be 




Though with ample oscillations, the average tax rate appears to have behaved in a 
procyclical way: going down during recessionary periods such as 1929-34, 1956-66 and 
1979-81; and going up in the first decade of the postwar period, and during the dynamic 
growth years between 1966 and 1972. An important step forward followed the tax 
reforms of the mid 1980s which re-established fiscal equilibrium. That achievement 
would not last long. Although the tax rate kept increasing over the 1990s and early 
2000s, that rhythm did not have strength comparable to that of government spending. A 
significant break date in 1983 characterizes the series.  
 
                                                        
23/  The best specification for the Tax Rate was as follows: 
 
Tax Rate (t) = 0.1552 time-trend + 0.8851 Tax Rate (t-1);  R
2: 0.94 
t-values   (12.73)   (19.05) 
The ADF unit root test applied to the estimated residuals of the previous estimated equation, gave the 
following results: 
Δ(Estimated Residuals) = 0.023 – 1.205 Estimated Residuals (t-1) 
t-values    (0.315)  (-10.735)   30
 
Graph 12 
Average tax rate 





The time paths of government revenues and expenditures are finally reflected in the 
evolution of the primary budget deficit -Graph 13-. A stop-go sequence of fiscal deficits 
characterizes the Colombian experience since 1950. Deficits in the early 1960s and 
1980s were practically shaped by the evolution of government expenditures. The 1980s 
episode is singular since governments financed most of the increased spending with 
financial proceeds from the investment and management of international reserves 
accumulated during the coffee bonanza of the late 1970s. If these proceeds are treated as 
revenues in the same way as tax receipts the budget deficit of the early 1980s is replaced 
by an average surplus of about 1.3% of GDP between 1977 and 1985. The series comes 
to its end by revealing an unprecedented experience: since the early 1990s the primary 
budget deficit appears to increase and persist at high GDP levels not reached in the past. 
 
Graph 13   31
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Sources for original fiscal data: 
Informe del Contralor. Yearbook. 
For GDP series: As for Graph 2 
 
 
3. Public debt 
 
a. External debt 
 
The public debt has been predominant in the composition of the total external debt. 
Some outstanding dates are illustrative. By the end of the U.S. lending boom in 1928, 
the percentage share was 71%. In 1950, when all the renegotiations of the external debt 
which had been defaulted in the 1930s were concluded, the share was 84%. These high 
figures declined during the 1960s and 1970s when the private sector gained a major 
portion of external credit. In fact, by 1970, when the access of the country to 
concessional sources of foreign lending was flourishing, the share of the public sector 
was 76%, and when the Latin American debt problem went off in 1982, the 
participation of public indebtedness had fallen to 65%. In the following years the 
nominal external debt of the private sector (in US dollars) ceased to grow, while the 
public debt carried on rising; as a result, by 1985, the share of the public sector in the 
total external debt was 75%.  
 
It was in the 1990s, when after foreign-exchange reforms which facilitated the access of 
private borrowers to foreign lending, and in the midst of a boom of international loans, 
the external debt of the private sector reached its highest in the 20
th century. In fact, by 
1997 the external debt on the shoulders of private borrowers amounted to 50% of the 
total external debt. When in 1997-1998 the slump in net financial flows hit Asia and 
Latin America, the access of private borrowers to international lending receded, and at 
the turn of the century its share was just above 30% of total external debt.  
 
Graph 14 shows the path of external public debt weighted by exports, D/X. The series is 
broken down according to the two main public debtors: the central government, and the 
rest of the public sector. The rest of the public sector is formed by public   32
administrations different from the central government such as provincial authorities 
(departments) and local authorities (municipalities), and also by public enterprises. The 
difference between the two lines in the graph represents the relative importance of the 
rest of the public sector indebtedness. Three peaks dominate the series in 1933, 1971, 



















External debt of the central government, and of the total public sector as a proportion of exports. 
Sources 
Banco de la Republica 
 
The vertical upsurge of D/X during the 1925-33 period is illustrated by the fact that in 
1925 less than 5 months of exports were required to pay off the whole public debt while 
in 1933 that requirement amounted to 30 months. Two different subperiods have to be 
noted, however. Between 1925 and 1928 public debt grew much more rapidly than 
exports, and the D/X ratio increased from 0.35 to 1.21. It has to be seen that this 
subperiod coincided with the U.S. private lending boom which expired by 1928. During 
the next five years the D/X ratio continuously increased, reaching the height of 2.52 in 
spite of the paralysis of foreign lending. This evolution is explained by a 55% collapse 
of exports, which was precipitated by the downturn of commodity prices during the 
great depression. In conclusion, no more than 40% of the substantial increase of the 
D/X ratio during the 1925-33 period can be ascribed to actual indebtedness of the public 
sector. This upshot is important to understand how standard measures of 
creditworthiness (as D/X) were adversely affected by the international downfall of 
commodity prices.  
 
The steep increase of the D/X ratio during 1925-33 was entirely reversed during the 
following years until the end of World War II. Some facts are to be noted. First, since 
the access to long-term lending had been suspended since 1928, the D/X fall is mainly 
explained by increased exports. Second, although an official moratoria of debt   33
repayments was gradually adopted in 1932-33, the central government and other public 
entities made partial buybacks of external debt
24. 
 
The first fifteen years after the end of World War II seem to reflect a long interlude 
between episodes of accelerated external public indebtedness. But in fact, the nominal 
stocks of debt which had been declining since 1931 started growing again in 1948. Two 
phases can be distinguished in the "pause" period 1947-60. A first one between 1947 
and 1953 when a notable increase of 70% in the nominal stock of external public debt 
resulted inferior to an upturn of exports of more than 100%. This upsurge of exports 
resulted from the coffee bonanza of the early 1950s. Conversely, the second phase was 
characterized by a minimum change in the nominal debt (3%) and a slightly negative 
growth of exports. The final effect of these facts was that along the "interlude" period 




Contrary to the experience of the 1920s, the sharp increase of external indebtedness 
during the 1960s was financed by official institutions, mainly the International 
Development Agency (IDA), the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), and the 
World Bank. At its height in 1971, central government indebtedness represented one 
year of exports, a burden just inferior to that experienced in the critical years 1932-33; 
the total indebtedness of the public sector amounted to over two years of exports, a 
burden similar to that of the years 1930-33. These debt burdens fell by 50% between 
1971 and 1978, principally due to the rapid increase of exports: while the nominal stock 
of public debt doubled during these years, the nominal flow of exports multiplied by 4. 
As a matter of fact, the nominal increase of public debt between 1971 and 1978 
exceeded that of the period 1960-71 of "high indebtedness". Therefore, the path of 
exports made a crucial difference for the increasing external debt burden in the 1960s 
followed by its sharp decline in the 1970s. 
 
An important change in the sources of external funds for the public sector took place 
during the 1970s. Foreign commercial banks became increasingly important while 
official credits lacked the dynamism of the 1960s. Coinciding with the international 
boom of private commercial bank loans during the years 1978-82, 68% of the new 
external public indebtedness of Colombia was disbursed by those creditors. One of the 
similarities of this process with the experience of the 1920s was the private character of 
the lenders, though in contrast with that precedent, in recent times they were typified by 
bank syndicates instead of atomized investors, and loans were extended on a medium-, 
short-term basis rather than on a long-term basis. Another contrast is that, as 
commented above, although the 1982 crisis interrupted the "voluntary" lending of 
commercial banks to the public sector, the official lending sustained the curve of 
increasing external indebtedness. As a result, towards 1987 the ratio of external public 
debt to exports outstripped the high coefficients reached at the time of the great 
depression. 
 
                                                        
24/  A detailed exposition of this process is offered in Avella (2004) 
25/  An important episode took place in the mid-1950s. It was a substantial accumulation of trade 
debts in the aftermath of the coffee bonanza (1954-57) which required extraordinary balance-of-payments 
loans. These exceptional and temporary loans were granted with the only purpose of refinancing short-
term trade debts and entirely repayed before the mid-1960s (Avella, 2004)   34
The emerging market credit cycle of 1994-1998 contributed to a considerable increase 
of the gross debt of major international debtors
26. Colombia’s total external debt went 
up by 54% in that period, but its public sector only borrowed one third of the new 
indebtedness. The lending boom of the 1990s was the time for the private sector. But, 
by the end of the first quinquenium of the new century, the stock of public debt 
recovered its traditional predominance, amounting to 68% of total external debt. 
 
In conclusion, the following facts are highlighted: First, the historical predominance of 
public indebtedness in the composition of the external debt of Colombia during the 
period of study. Second, the burden of the external public debt measured according to 
the D/X ratio has depended not only on the magnitude of public indebtedness (the 
numerator) but importantly on the fate of exports in commodity markets. Consequently, 
adverse shocks on exports (such as in the early 1930s and 1960s) have negatively 
affected creditworthiness. 
 
b. Internal debt 
 
1) Crucial episodes 
 
In the evolution of the internal public debt, as depicted in Graph 15, five expansionary 
episodes are worthnoting: the 1932-33 extraordinary increase in internal debt after the 
negative impacts of the great depression on the external sector; the enlargement of 
internal debt during World War II after the collapse of import duties and the 
implementation of policies orientated to smooth out adverse effects of the war on the 
economy; the early 1960s one-shot increase in government liabilities destined to finance 
central bank losses in the foreign exchange market, and also government programs in 
connection with national priorities and international objectives of the Alliance of 
Progress; the upsurge of internal indebtedness after the external shocks of the early 
1980s, particularly the near extinction of commercial foreign lending to the country; and 
finally, the increase of government borrowing in internal capital markets, after the 
collapse of the emerging market credit cycle of 1994-1997. The internal debt of the 
national government increased from 6.8% of GDP in 1995-1996 to 29% in 2002-2003. 
These facts suggest a connection between severe external crises and exceptionally large 
internal debt upswings. The historically substantial increases of internal public debt in 
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26/  The gross debt of the 17 most heavily indebted countries increased by one third between 1994 
and 1998. World Bank. Global Development Finance (2004) 
27/  The estimated coefficients for the only significant brake point in the series are as follows: 
For the period 1926-1981: 0.03745; t-value: 2.01 
For the period 1982-2003: 0.17727; t-value: 3.09   35
 
Notes 
dloripd: annual changes in real internal public debt 
Original source of data: Informe del Contralor. Yearboook. 
 
Some important economic and institutional characteristics affected the evolution of 
internal public debt in the 20
th century. The internal market for government bonds was 
quite limited for decades, and the access of the government to central bank loans 
restricted by regulations whose severity varied over time. How can then internal public 
debt have had any meaningful role in the Colombia's experience? How could the 
positive cycles of internal debt described in the previous paragraph have been financed? 
The main sources of financing were ad-hoc central bank loans to the government whose 
extraordinary magnitude brought about internal debt growth rates above the historical 




                                                        
28/  The experience of the early 1940s and early 1960s was different. In the first case, there was a 
massive and to a great extent forced allocation of public bonds in the private sector as part of a plan of 
stabilization during World War II. In the second case, large losses of the central bank in the foreign 
exchange market during the "external strangulation" period were transformed into government liabilities.   36
The extraordinary loans of the central bank to the government are reflected in the 
composition of internal public debt. While during the 1930s those loans represented 
about 30% of the nominal stock of internal debt, in the 1983-85 period they amounted 
to 70%. The rest of the time its importance was none or negligible, apart from 
temporary increases in the mid-1950s and first half of the 1970s
29. 
 
After the huge expansion of loans of the Central Bank in favor of the National 
Government in the 1980s, the internal public debt in the balance sheet of the Bank 
represented more than 60% of total internal public debt. This important part of internal 
debt was consolidated in 1992, when the original loans were transformed in government 
bonds (TES A). Since then, the crucial government bond in internal markets has been a 
Treasury liability, the TES B. Brought into being in 1992, at the end of that year the 
TES B represented 14% of total internal debt. By 1995, the comparable figure was 71%, 
and since then its share has oscillated between 50% and 60%. Apart from being the 
dominant government bond of the last decade and a half, it has been the instrument of 
crucial institutional changes. For the first time since the original Kemmerer Mission it 
has been possible to have a market for internal public debt. Monetary authorities could 
put in place Open Market Operations in a way similar to more advanced economies. 
And during the economic recession at the turn of the century, the upswing in internal 
public debt was materialized by selling bonds in the market and not by borrowing from 
the Bank of the Republic as it was usual in the past. 
 
The central bank's credit to the government is not limited to extraordinary loans. The 
central bank is the "bank of the government", and therefore the relevant account which 
summarizes the financial relationship between the Treasury and the bank is the net 
credit to the government. This account is debited whenever loans and other lending 
operations to the government are made, and is credited as a result of Treasury deposits 
in the bank
30. The concept of net credit facilitates to examine the importance of 
government financing in the balance sheet of the central bank. It also permits to 
describe the relative weight of central bank credit in the domestic sources of 
government financing different from open market sales of bonds. 
 
Regarding the importance of government loans in the central bank balance sheet, Graph 
16 shows the percentage share of them and net international reserves in the monetary 
base, respectively.  
 
Graph 16 
Central Bank Credit and Foreign Reserves 
                                                        
29/  At least two precisions have to be made about the importance of central bank loans in the 1930s. 
First, only during the brief period 1931-33 there were significant loans to the government reaching a share 
of over 30% of internal debt; the share remained practically constant up to 1937 simply because in a 
period of stagnated internal debt there were no amortizations of loans up to that year. Second, there was 
an abrupt reduction of loans to nil values in the early 1940s which did not correspond to amortization in 
the usual way; it was a conversion of a government liability into a long-term investment of the central 
bank. Otherwise the loans share would have continued at its previous level. 
30/  Historically, other lending operations included items such as conversions of external obligations 
of the government into internal debt, and the results of specific transactions carried out by the central 
bank which were finally charged to the public debt. Examples of the first case can be found since the 
1940s (Eximbank loans) and were common in the 1960s (IDA and other international agencies' loans). 
The best example of the second case is offered by the losses made by the central bank in the foreign 
exchange market during the 1960s which were charged to the public debt. 
   37
1925-2004 
Banco de la República (Central Bank)
Net credit to the Government
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Net credit of the central bank to the government, and net foreign reserves of the central bank, as a % of 
the monetary base. 
Sources of original data: 
Informe del Gerente a la Junta Directiva del Banco de la República (1925-1980) 
Banco de la República: www.banrep.org/ 
 
The message conveyed by these graphs is the countercyclical behaviour of the central 
bank net credit to the government. Whenever the share of international reserves in the 
monetary base increases (decreases), the share of net credit to the government falls   38
(raises). The net credit to the government appears to be neutralizing -partially at least- 
the monetary effects of the balance of payments. 
 
As for the share of central bank net credit in domestic sources of government financing 
different from bond sales to the public, the concept of seigniorage is used. The 
conventional definition which considers the changes in the monetary base as a 
proportion of GDP, as applied, for instance, in Fischer (1982), is not applied here. An 
alternative definition is considered. Accordingly, seigniorage (S) is equal to the annual 
changes in net credit of the central bank to the government. These resources can be 
supplemented by the proceeds obtained by the government, if any, from the investment 
of international reserves. This sort of definition is favoured in relevant literature, 
particularly in Drazen (1985, 1988) and Spaventa (1988). By considering seigniorage 
and tax revenues as a whole, the path of seigniorage over time can be depicted in 
relation to this total, as in Graph 17. As expected, seigniorage is mostly important in the 
1930s, 1960s, and 1980s. Seigniorage is particularly meaningful in the 1980s, first due 
to unprecedented returns on international reserves in 1979-83, and second, due to 


























































































































































































































Seigniorage (S): annual changes in net credit of the central bank to the government, plus financial 
proceeds from the investment of international reserves. 
Sources. Informe del Gerente a la Junta Directiva del Banco de la República (1925-1980) 
Banco de la República: www.banrep.org/ 
 
 
The central fact emphasized at this point is how the positive cycles of internal public 
debt are created in response to severely critical periods of the external sector and 
internal depression. When it was required before the 1990s, the extraordinary increases 
of internal debt were financed by ad-hoc loans of the central bank to the government. 
 
2) The shock absorber role of the internal public debt. 
 
The shock absorber role of the internal public debt is documented next in a highly 
stylized way, based on the similarities of the Colombian experience both in the 1930s   39
and 1980s, and to some extent in the 1990s, but minimizing references to specific 
details. 
 
Consider simultaneous external shocks arising in both the goods and the capital 
markets. The severity of these shocks leads to paralysis in export sectors and deep 
recession in home markets. In the financial sector, the central bank experiences 
substantial losses of foreign reserves with the consequent drain on the money supply. 
As for commercial banks, both sides of the balance sheet are adversely affected: the 
suspension of foreign financing by international banks and the reduction of the money 
supply create strains on the liabilities' side, while because of the recession (and deflation 
as in the early 1930s) the quality of assets is critically damaged by a high proportion of 
bad loans. An economy-wide debtors' problem arises and there are symptoms that the 
public is losing confidence in the stability of the banking system. 
 
How do authorities react to these developments? At the very beginning they express 
their conviction that the external problem is a temporary one, and therefore there is no 
justification for changes in policy. As the external position of the country deteriorates 
authorities adopt contractionary measures on public spending (a draconian adjustment 
in the 1930s) to alleviate pressures on the balance of payments; it is understood that this 
is the best contribution of the government to the stability of the exchange regime (gold 
standard in the early 1930s and a fixed real exchange rate in the early 1980s). Regarding 
the external debt, authorities consider that the reduction or suspension of foreign 
lending being a temporary phenomenon, the best way of regaining access to 
international credit is to honor thoroughly the debt service, regardless of unilateral 
suspensions of debt service adopted by other debtors. In a nutshell, authorities judge 
that fiscal austherity, exchange rate stability and full repayment of the external debt 
service contribute to stabilize the economy and guarantee the resurgence of external 
lending to the country. 
 
It is the rapid depletion of international reserves, the proximity of collapse of the 
banking system and extraordinary developments in foreign capital markets (particularly 
in the 1930s with the abandonment of the gold standard by Great Britain [1931], and the 
devaluation of the U.S. dollar [1933]) which lead authorities to change policies. Those 
changes initially contemplate the adoption (as in 1931) or reinforcement (as in 1983) of 
exchange controls and commercial policies to stop the drain on foreign reserves long 
before more drastic measures are imposed (in the 1930s these strong measures meant 
suspension of the gold standard and adoption of a managed-float-exchange-rate regime, 
and partial default on the external debt service. In the 1980s they only meant substantial 
acceleration of the rate of depreciation of the crawling peg to correct an overvalued 
exchange rate). 
 
Where is internal public debt in this story? In spite of the government expenditure 
retrenchment a substantial budget deficit appears. It is the endogenous result of the 
adverse external shock originated in the export market (in particular the collapse of 
coffee prices after periods of bonanza in the late 1920s and late 1970s) and the 
subsequent slowdown of economic activity. By then, getting fresh external funds for 
fiscal purposes is a remote possibility, and the banking system finds it extremely 
difficult to finance imports, an important (crucial in the early 1930s) source of tax 
revenues. Up to this point the stock of internal public debt has been increased by selling   40
bonds to the public, and also to the central bank, within strict regulations which limit the 
loans to the government to a certain proportion of the capital of the institution. 
 
The role of internal public debt is not limited to provide automatic stabilization, 
however. Even this function is substantially constrained by a relatively small market for 
public bonds (in the early 1930s severely affected by lost of confidence in financial 
markets), and the aforementioned restricted access to central bank loans. At some point 
authorities find themselves with a badly depressed domestic economy (and substantial 
deflation in the early 1930s), international reserves nearly exhausted, vital export 
sectors going bankrupt, the banking system facing insolvency rather than illiquidity, the 
treasury accumulating a backlog of immediate obligations, and no hope of getting 
funding abroad. After adopting the new exchange and foreign debt policies mentioned 
above, authorities turn to policies of domestic recovery (reflation in the 1930s), rescue 
of the banking system and support of crucial economic sectors (coffee growers in the 
1930s). Authorities obtain from Congress the legal authorization for extraordinary loans 
of the central bank to the government, with limited amounts, temporary character and 
specific purposes (recapitalization of banks, public works and others. In the 1930s a war 
with a neighbouring country demanded additional loans). In the 1980s, various credit 
lines were opened by Congress in the Central Bank for the purposes of economic 
recovery. This is the extraordinary and temporary expedient by which internal public 
debt absorbs part of the negative effects of the external shocks on the economy. 
 
What is coming next? Authorities embark in a process of fiscal reform substantially 
orientated to strengthen tax revenues (in the 1930s to consolidate direct taxation and 
reduce the fiscal dependence from custom duties, and in the 1980s to simplify existing 
systems and reinforce the VAT). Also authorities seek to accommodate to the new 
situation in foreign capital markets (sporadic short-term loans from subsidiaries of 
foreign companies in Colombia during the 1930s, and only refinancing loans, instead of 
fresh credits, between 1983 and 1990). 
 
How do the extraordinary loans affect the maturity structure of the internal public debt? 
Although originally designed as short- or medium-term operations, the experience 
shows that the repayment of those loans is deferred well into the future (most of the 
extraordinary loans of 1932-34 due to be amortized by 1940 were actually redeemed in 
the early 1970s. Similarly, the extraordinary loans of 1983-1984 which were supposed 
to be repayed in the following two years were transformed into a 30-year loan). In other 
words, the tax burden of the shock absorbing increases in the internal public debt is 
largely translated to future generations of tax payers. 
 
 
4. The path and composition of central government debt. 
 
The relative composition of total public debt of the central government between their 
external and internal components is shown in Graph 18, where the real external debt is 
the area between the graphs for the real total debt and for the real internal debt. 
 
Graph 18   41
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Four main periods can be distinguished in the evolution of the real total debt. First, the 
interwar period during which three phases alternate. At the beginning of the series 
(1925) the internal debt represented 45% of the total, but due to the extraordinary access 
to the US lending during 1926-28, that figure declined to 16% by 1928. With the 
collapse of foreign lending, the share of internal debt started growing since 1930, and 
after the reflationary policies of 1932-33 reached the figure of 40%. Due to stabilization 
policies during World War II the share of internal debt rose to 60% and to 72% in the 
late 1940s, this time due to the rapid decline of the outstanding external debt which 
followed the renegotiations with foreign lenders carried out during the decade.  
 
The second period covers from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. During the second half 
of the 1950s the external debt started growing continuously and the participation of the 
internal debt declined. In 1962 the internal debt "jumped" (the real stock tripled) during 
a severe external crisis, and its share reached again highs of 70%. Since 1962 up to 
1974 the internal debt grew only to sustain a relatively constant real stock, but its share 
declined to 35%; during the same period the real stock of external debt quadrupled. 
 
The third period covers from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s. For some years (1975-
1978), both the external and the internal debt declined, but the latter at a very much 
greater pace; by 1981 the external debt was growing again and the share of the internal 
debt reached its lowest figure in the series: 12%. A new phase started in 1982: the 
internal debt "jumped", again coinciding with a new external sector crisis which 
involved not only the current but the capital account. Repeating an experience similar to 
that of the early 1930s, the internal debt increased reaching a share of 43% by 1984. 
Graph 15 is eloquent about the rapid recovery of external debt since 1984. In fact, the 
real stock of external debt doubled between 1984 and 1990. In the meantime, the real 
stock of internal debt continuously declined since 1985, and its share was only 25% by 
1990.  
 
The fourth period covers from 1990 to 2003. A central role would be performed by the 
internal public debt. Up to 1996 there was a deliberate substitution of internal for 
external debt destined to reduce an unintended accumulation of international reserves.   42
At that time, the access to external indebtedness was in the hands of the private sector. 
Between 1990 and 1996 the stock of external public debt in real terms fell by 39% 
while the stock of internal public debt in real terms increased by 89%. As a result, the 
share of the internal debt doubled, reaching 50% in 1996. In the second half of the 
1990s and first three years of the new decade, when external private indebtedness 
receded, both external and internal public debt increased in tandem, multiplying by four 
their real stocks. 
 
An important factor which affects the composition of the public debt in national 
currency is the depreciation of the exchange rate, since the external debt is contracted in 
foreign currencies. Some examples can be mentioned regarding important changes in 
the share of external debt as revealed in Graph 15. As for the period 1962-1973 during 
which the share of the external debt increased from 32% to 67%, only 23% of the 
increment in the nominal stock of external debt (in Pesos) can be ascribed to changes in 
the stock (in US dollars), 18% to variations in the exchange rate, and 58% to a mixed 
effect of changes in both the dollar stock of debt and the exchange rate. Also during the 
1982-1986 period, during which the real external debt doubled, only 11% of the change 
in the nominal stock can be explained by the increase in the stock (in US dollars), 63% 
by depreciations of the exchange rate, and 26% by a combined effect of both variables. 
 
These descriptions corroborate previous observations that the internal debt tended to 
move in the opposite direction of the external debt. It has also been established that 
important changes in the composition of total debt in national currency, in favour of the 
external component, are largely explained by debt-revaluation effects of exchange rate 
changes. 
 
5. The intertemporal government budget constraint 
 
Having observed the evolution of government expenditures, government revenues and 
public debt, is there any way in which to employ the government accountancy to discuss 
the "internal consistency" of fiscal expenditures, revenues and indebtedness over time? 
The accounting framework suggests that such an assessment can be carried out with 
reference to the present value government budget constraint. Put in the context of the 
rational-actor framework, the question amounts to ask whether governments have 
followed sustainable financial policies in the long run. 
 
Sustainability has been a recurrent topic in public debt theorizing. The solvency of a 
nation was the focus of attention in Domar (1950) application of Harrod-Domar models 
to foreign debt issues, and the common thread in analyses of Latin American and other 
international borrowers written for the World Bank in the 1960s (Avramovic and 
Gulhati, 1958, 1960; Avramovic et al. 1964). This literature revived during the debt 
crises of the 1980s (general illustrations are provided in Cline [1983], Kharas [1984], 
and Simonsen [1985]).  
 
Rather than the national solvency, the solvency of the central government is the main 
interest in this section. As for methodology, the discussion follows an approach which is 
closer to representative-agent models, than to the tradition of Harrod-Domar models. 
 
The budget constraint faced by the government in period t+1 can be written as follows: 
   43
    Bt+1 - Bt = rBt + Gt+1 - Tt+1 
 
where the left-hand side shows the change in total (internal and external) real public 
debt during t+1, and the right-hand side shows the interest service (domestic and world 
interest rates are assumed equal) paid on the real stock of debt at the end of t, and the 
primary deficit incurred at t+1. The single-period budget constraint can be transformed 
into an intertemporal relationship by performing recursive substitutions for successive 
future values of the real stock of debt (Bt+j, j=1,2,...). Taking expected values (E) at time 
t, the solvency constraint of the national government is: 
 
    Bt = -∑j=1
∞V
jEt[Gt+j - Tt+j] + lim V
jEtBt+j 
     j →∞ 
where V = 1/(1+r). 
 
For the solvency constraint to hold, the following terminal condition has to be satisfied: 
 
 lim  V
jEtBt+j = 0 
  j →∞ 
 
This terminal condition shows that the solvency constraint holds so long as B does not 
increase faster than r. An alternative reading of the solvency constraint indicates that 
provided the terminal condition is satisfied, the outstanding value of B is equal to the 
present value of future government surpluses. 
 
The empirical implications of the solvency constraint have been examined since the 
1980s. As indicated by McCallum (1984) and Hamilton and Flavin (1986) the present 
value budget constraint is compatible with a constant budget deficit inclusive of interest 
payments. This implication is developed in a stochastic context by Trehan and Walsh 
(1988). These authors propose a test of the solvency constraint which relies on the 
cointegration of (Gt+rBt) and Tt (Graph 19 for the paths of government revenues and 
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Real government revenues and government expenditures in logs. 
 
 
As shown in Table 3 there is one unit root in the process for (Gt+rBt) and also one unit 
root in the process for Tt. Being these two processes integrated of order 1, both are 
cointegrated, provided the residuals obtained from regressing one on the other are 
stationary (Engle and Granger, 1987). Following the results provided by causality tests, 
a regression between the two series was performed, having Tt as the independent 
variable. Having estimated the long-run equilibrium relation, its residuals were checked 




Tests for Unit Roots* 
Sample Period: 1925-2003 
Real values in logs 
 
 
   Government     Government     Annual 
   Expenditure   revenues   changes  in   
   inclusive  of      public  debt 
   interest 
 
Constant   0.1301    0.0257        0.0620 
   (0.6273)   (0.1573)       (2.659) 
 
Lagged  level   -0.0042  0.0029        -0.7685 
   (-0.3379)   (0.2888)       (-6.9982) 
Number of lags of   45
differenced variable       1            1        0 
 
* Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests 
t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 4 exhibits pairwise Granger causality tests as well as weak exogeneity tests. 
Results suggest that revenues Granger cause expenditures, but not the other way round. 






Granger causality tests and weak-exogeneity tests 
Series: Revenues and Government expenditures inclusive of interest  
Sample: 1925-2003 
 
1. Granger causality 
77  annual  observations     F-Statistic    Probability 
Null hypothesis: 
1. Gt + rtBt-1 does not Granger cause Tt   0.8282   0.4409 
2. Tt does not Granger cause Gt +rtBt-1   10.344   0.0001 
 
 
2. Weak exogeneity 
       Revenues          Expenditures 
LR test χ




Table 5 summarizes the cointegration results according to the Johansen methodology. 
Both the trace tests and the maximum eigenvalue tests draw to the conclusion that there 
was cointegration, and that there existed a single cointegrating vector between 
government revenues and government expenditures inclusive of interests during the 
period 1925-2003. Then, it is possible to speak about a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between those key series of government financial behaviour over time. 
 
                                                        
31/  According to the Engle-Granger testing procedure, the long-run equilibrium relationship between 
government expenditures inclusive of interest payments and government revenues is estimated by using 
an equation like (Gt + rtBt-1) = βo + β1Tt + et.  The estimated coefficients and the corresponding tests 
(according to the t-statistic) are the following: 
  Estimated  coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant  -0.99       -4.17 
Revenues    1.07       74.54,   R
2 = 0.99 
 
Residual regression:  
Lagged level coefficient: -0.6517 
ADF test    -5.15. Critical value at 1% level: -3.51  
Lags of differenced variable: 2 
Normality of the residuals. Test of Jarque-Bera: 0.745. Critical value at 5% level (χ




Sample period: 1925-2003 
 
A. Testing hypothesis. Determining the rank of matrix π 
 
1. λtrace tests 
 
Null Alternative  λtrace value  Critical value (95%) 
   
r = 0  r > 0    25.04      15.49 
r ≤ 1  r > 1    0.242        3.84 
 
2. λmax tests 
 
Null Alternative  λmax value  Critical value (95%) 
 
r = 0  r = 1    24.80      14.26 
r = 1  r = 2    0.242        3.84 
 
B. Normalized cointegrating vector β and speed of adjustment vector α 
 





t-value   (-56.247) 
 
2. Adjustment coefficients 
 
Revenues: -0.0767 
t-value     (-0.7040) 
 
Expenditures: 0.6073 
t-value   (4.5402) 
 
c. Tests for normality and serial correlation 
 
Joint test Jarque-Bera for the null hypothesis that the residuals are multivariate normal, 
with 4 degrees of freedom: 5.97; 95%; critical value (χ
2 distribution): 9.49 
Under the null of no serial correlation, the Lagrange Multiplier test gives the following 
results, up to the specified order: 
LM(1), χ
2(4) = 7.64; 95% critical value: 9.49 
LM(4), χ
2(4) = 2.08; 95% critical value: 9.49 
 
Notes: 
Matrix π is defined as (A1 – I) where A1 is a matrix of parameters and I is an identity 
matrix.   47
 
 
Similar results should be expected if instead of testing for cointegration between 
revenues and expenditures, it is the stationarity in the first difference of the stock of 
public debt which is examined. As seen in Table 3 it is possible to reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root in the series of annual changes in public debt. 
 
To sum up, the accounting framework of present values makes possible to get a further 
understanding of the consistency of long-run government financial policies in the case 
study. This survey of fiscal facts since the 1920s can be enriched by the general idea 
that the Colombian government has led sustainable financial policies over time.  
 
 
6. Tax rates and inflation 
 
Graph 20 shows the rate of inflation path along the period of study; the series follows a 
stationary process
32. Three great phases can be observed. The first one -1925 through 
1955- reflects the dramatic changes of the external sector which accompanied the boom 
of the late 1920s, the impacts of the great depression which led to an average deflation 
rate of 19% during 1930-32 (23% only in 1932) and a new deflationary episode after the 
outbreak of World War II. A one-shot spectacular increase in the rate of inflation right 
to the peak of 39% in 1934 followed activist reflationary policies implemented after the 
suspension of the gold exchange standard. Inflationary waves arose under different 
external contexts: during the second half of the War when with a blocked imports trade 
a rapid and unprecedented accumulation of international reserves resulted in a huge 
expansion of base money; and in the immediate postwar years, in spite of the 
contractionary effects of boosting imports which drained the stock of foreign reserves 
previously accumulated. Both episodes were followed by deflationary policies which 




                                                        
32/  The ADF test equation is: 
ΔInflation (t)  =  5.52 – 0.42Inflation (t-1) 
t-values   (3.41)  (-4.54) 
Critical values: At 1% level, 3.52   48
Inflation rate

























































































































CPI: Consumer Price Index 
Sources 
Cepal (1957) 
IMF. International Financial Statistics 
 
In the second great phase two subperiods can be differentiated: an interval of mild 
inflation between 1956 and 1970 when disregarding a notable once-for-all increment in 
1963 the average inflation rate did not exceed 9%; and an interval of higher inflation 
between 1971 and 1990 when the average inflation rate was above 22%. A distinctive 
characteristic of this last subperiod was the permanence of inflation rates at high levels. 
Inflation rates crossed the threshold of 20% after the first oil-price shock and remained 
at that height revealing the presence of inertial components which tended to reproduce 
past rates of inflation. 
 
The last phase covers the 1990s and the first quinquennium of the new century. It is 
characterized by a gradual, almost uninterrupted fall of the inflation rate. This fall was 
more acute when the economy was subjected to a substantial slowdown at the end of the 
century. In Graph 21, the presence of a break point in 1990 emphasizes this entirely new 
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33/  The estimated coefficients for the break point in 1990 are as follows: 
For the period 1926-1990: 0.004785; t-value: 2.00 
For the period 1991-2003: -0.019923; t-value: 2.13   49
 
Notes: 
Dinflation: Annual changes in growth rates of CPI (Consumer Price Index) 
 
 
Why this concern about the evolution of inflation rates in the middle of the discussion 
of government expenditures, tax revenues and debt? An important approach to public 
finance analyzes inflation from a public finance viewpoint. This approach follows 
Phelps contributions (1972, 1973). The optimal public finance model sees inflation rates 
as a result of an optimal choice of taxation. Additionally, the theory predicts a positive 
and proportional relationship between tax rates and the rate of inflation. The previous 
description, however, does not seem to support the idea that inflation rates have resulted 
from a deliberate choice of taxation. Nor it appears to exist a direct and proportional 
relationship between tax and inflation rates (graphs 16 and 20). 
 
An important strand of literature follows Mankiw (1987) who combines Barro (1979) 
original modern exposition of the tax-smoothing theory and Phelps (1973) contribution 
to the theory of public finance
34. Mankiw aims to show that if monetary and fiscal 
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policies are used to optimally finance government expenditures, the inflation rate and 
the tax rate will behave like random walks, and evolve together over time. The inflation 
rate is taken as a proxi of the tax rate on real money balances. 
 
A simple test of the central implication of the theory that higher inflation rates and 
higher tax rates are associated over time may be performed by examining the correlation 
of average tax rates with the inflation rate (Table 6) 
 
Table 6 
Inflation rates and Tax rates 
1925-2003 
 
Inflation  =  12.61 + 0.73 Time Trend – 4.39 Tax Rate 
    (4.14)  (6.59)         (-4.51) 
R
2 = 0.38;   DW = 1.44 
 
 
This simple exercise is similar to that applied by Mankiw (1987) to the U.S. experience 
during the period 1952-85, and by Roubini and Sachs (1989) to the performance of 15 
OECD countries during the period 1960-85. Mankiw found a positive and significant 
correlation between the average tax rate and the rate of inflation, in support of the tax-
smoothing theory. Roubini and Sachs confirmed Mankiw finding for the United States 
and found support for the underlying hypothesis in the case of two other OECD 
countries; however, no significant correlation between (INFL) and (TAX) was found for 
other 12 countries, and even for five countries the sign of the relationship between these 
two variables was negative. 
 
In the present case, there is a significantly negative correlation between the variables 
under discussion, therefore rejecting the applicability of the theory to the Colombian 
experience. The coefficient on (TAX) is notably large, suggesting that an increase in 
taxes of 1% of GDP is associated with a reduction of 4.4% in the inflation rate. The 
absence of positive correlation between (INFL) and (TAX) is not a strange result after 
the discussion of the paths followed by the average tax rate and the inflation rate 
(graphs 16 and 20). While the theory implies that governments choose inflation rates as 
part of optimal tax decisions, the description of episodes did not leave that impression
35. 
 
The testing procedure employed by Mankiw, and Roubini and Sachs, has been 
questioned for not exploring the full implications of the theory, in particular for not 
inquiring about integration and cointegration properties of the processes for inflation 
and tax rate. Authors such as Grilli (1989) and Trehan and Walsh (1990) show how 
under the tax smoothing framework, non-stationarity of the processes for (INFL) and 
(TAX) is a necessary condition. In the present case, it was previously shown that 
contrary to the theoretical requirement, both processes are stationary. These results 
should be interpreted with some precaution, however, since as recalled by Grilli et al. 
(1991), the prediction that "optimal" tax rates are non-stationary is obtained from 
models which do not take into account that tax rates are bounded between zero and one. 
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In conclusion, the discussion of graphs 16 and 20 suggest that inflation rates have not 
been a public finance fact in the Colombian experience. Further insights indicate that 
the processes for the inflation rate and the tax rate do not match with theoretical 
predictions. 
 
D. Financial intermediation and public debt 
 
This last section shows how financial intermediation in Colombia has been affected by 
the boom-and-bust cycles of external capital markets, and how under extreme 
circumstances the collapse of financial institutions has been prevented by the use of 
internal public debt. A description of ups and downs of the financial intermediation 
system adds new elements to the picture of external and internal debt.  
 
Graph 22 depicts the evolution of two standard indicators of financial deepening: one is 
the ratio of the money supply to output (M1/GDP); and the other one the ratio of 
financial assets in the hands of the public which are liabilities of financial institutions, to 
output (Financial assets/GDP). Three phases are clearly distinguished: an extraordinary 
development of the financial system relative to the size of the economy during the 
booming late 1920s interrupted by a sudden collapse in 1932; nearly four decades of 
stagnated financial progress until the late 1960s; a substantial and sustained process of 
financial deepening in the 1970s, interrupted during the international financial crisis of 
that time; and finally, an extraordinary advance in financial deepening in the 1990s, 
only comparable to the financial boom of the 1920s; both experiences of the 1920s and 
the 1990s ended up in major financial crises. 
 
Crucial institutional changes opened the first phase. A financial reform in 1923 
instituted the system of central bank and commercial banks following the model of the 
U.S. Federal Reserve System. Commercial banks were assumed to do the job foreseen 
in the English private banks model, namely, lending operations on a short-term basis 
(trade and working capital loans). As for the long run, mortgage banks were created or 
reorganized to compete for savings, locally and abroad, and to grant loans to agriculture 
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Sources 
Banco de la República. Informe del Gerente a la Junta Directiva (1925-1980) 
For the period 1980-2003: www.banrep.org/ 
 
 
Why the ephemeral success of financial intermediation during the first phase? External 
capital markets proved to be critical. With the apogee of private long-term funds in the 
New York financial market in the mid-1920s mortgage banks could sell an important 
proportion of their long-term issues to foreign investors. At the same time commercial 
banks enjoyed an easy access to short-term funds in U.S. commercial banks. Long-term 
funds for mortgage banks were sharply suspended after the 1929 crash, and short-term 
finance dried out in 1931. While the external expansion flourished, internal financial 
intermediation burgeoned with the general prosperity of the economy; and with the 
cessation of international lending and the negative impacts of the great depression (deep 
recession cum deflation) the process of financial deepening came to a halt. 
 
Only a decisive government intervention in 1932-33 avoided the collapse of the banking 
system, and more generally, of the credit structure in the economy. The internal public 
debt played a vital and extraordinary role in this process. Through a variety of ways 
which are spelled out in detail in other place, the internal public debt helped restore the 
machinery of private credit
36. One outstanding measure was the creation of official 
banks destined to replace the bankrupt mortgage banks; the initial capital of the new 
institutions was largely financed by the central bank through the acquisition of equity 
shares, or through loans whose liability was assumed by the government. 
 
A model of centralized financial decisions -in the sense of Gurley and Shaw (1955,)- 
predominated since the early 1930s through the late 1960s. The newly organized official 
banks were destined to supply credit to agriculture, industry and construction, according 
to government policy priorities. Interest rates were subjected to regulations after the 
great depression, and demand deposits became the main source of funds of private 
commercial banks; Graph 22 shows how financial intermediation ratios hinged on 
changes in the money supply rather than on interest-bearing deposits, for over three 
decades. During this period commercial banks became regular suppliers of loans to the 
government, and important investors on bonds of the internal public debt. 
 
During the phase of stagnated financial deepening, which largely coincided with 
inactivity of world private capital markets (1930s to 1960s), the access of private 
commercial banks to external funds was basically limited to the financing of external 
trade operations. However, some official banks were granted loans from developmental 
institutions. The Eximbank was an important source of funds even before the end of 
World War II. Later the World Bank and other agencies continued these special 
operations. Finally, during the 1960s developmental loans were granted by international 
organizations to newly created investment banks; these banks were established to attract 
long-term domestic and international funds required by the financing of projects in 
manufacturing, import-competing, and export-promoting sectors. 
 
A new phase of accelerated financial deepening characterized the 1970s, as a result of 
policies of financial liberalization and greater access to external private capital markets. 
The former favoured a major diversification of financial assets, and stimulated 
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competition (e.g. the creation of building societies in the early 1970s which disputed the 
predominance of commercial and investment banks. Competition began eroding the 
traditional centralized-financial-decisions model, and a rapid increase in financial 
deepening indicators was lived through the mid-1970s as revealed in Graph 17). The 
latter coincided with the boom of foreign commercial bank loans in the second half of 
the 1970s. Colombian banks not only tripled their external debt between 1978 and 1981 
but some of them opened offshore branches and engaged in lending operations to 
foreign debtors. 
 
By 1981 there were clear examples of crisis in the domestic financial system after the 
end of a coffee bonanza which dominated the second half of the 1970s. In this context, 
the aftermath of the Mexican debt crisis in 1982 had devastating effects on a system 
which was increasingly relying on external short- and medium-term funds. Domestic 
branches of Colombian banks faced a virtual paralysis of external trade financing, and 
some offshore branches practically went bankrupt. Offshore branches confronted the 
simultaneous effect of accumulating unpaid loans which immovilized their assets, and 
the suspension of external credits; headquarters had to accept the burden left by failed 
offshore expansion and consider solutions as a whole. 
 
Repeating the experience of the 1930s authorities intervened to avoid the collapse of the 
financial system. Governments resorted to increase internal public debt to strengthen the 
capital of some banks. Additionally, an important proportion of the external debt of 
private offshore branches was nationalized; as a matter of fact, it was the pressure of 
creditors (syndicates of commercial banks) during negotiations which eventually led to 
the extreme measure of nationalization. These episodes are extreme illustrations of how 
originally private-sector debts are transformed into public-sector debts. In the mid-
1980s the financial system was back on its path of financial deepening: in 1985 the 
percentage ratio of total financial assets to GDP reached 38% compared with 23% in 
1970 when the economy just recovered the peak level of financial deepening achieved 
before the great depression. 
 
The institutional reforms of the early 1990s made possible financial opening up along 
with the real opening up of trade flows. There was a constitutional recognition of central 
bank independence, and new laws in favor of competition in the financial sector were 
enacted. Financial assets grew at unprecedented rates, in great part fueled by the 
increased availability of foreign funding. By 1998, financial assets represented 40% of 
GDP, when in 1990 they barely represented 20%. The crisis of the end of the century 
interrupted that process of financial deepening, and in the last quinquennium of the 
series, financial assets became a rather constant share of GDP, at the level of 35%. Once 
again, as in the 1930s and 1980s, public finances came to the rescue of the financial 
sector; but instead of a once-for-all and substantial enlargement of the internal public 
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